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Drivers Of Stability Of Climate Coalitions In The Staco Model

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  • ROB DELLINK

    ()
    (Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group, Wageningen University, Hollandseweg 1, 6706 KN Wageningen, The Netherlands)

Abstract

This paper investigates which drivers affect the formation and stability of international climate agreements (ICAs). The applied model STACO is used to project costs and benefits of an international agreement on climate change mitigation activities. The simulation results show that an incentive-based permit allocation scheme is an essential driver in stabilizing larger coalitions. Regional damage shares turn out to be another driver of coalition formation but global damages do not seem to be, thus illustrating that international coalition formation is a matter of relative costs and benefits across regions. No allocation scheme can, however, assure the stability of a global agreement due to huge free-rider incentives. This requires alternative rules, such as a condition that some players are essential in a coalition, or accepting a small loss from cooperation.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal Climate Change Economics.

Volume (Year): 02 (2011)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
Pages: 105-128

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Handle: RePEc:wsi:ccexxx:v:02:y:2011:i:02:p:105-128

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Related research

Keywords: International climate agreements; tradable emission permits; coalition formation;

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Cited by:
  1. Thijs Dekker & Rob Dellink & Janina Ketterer, 2013. "The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement - Simulating the Influence of Fat Tails in Climate Change Damages on the Success of International Climate Negotiations," CESifo Working Paper Series 4059, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Rob Dellink & Thijs Dekker & Janina Ketterer, 2013. "The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 277-305, October.

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