Multi-Market Minority Game: Breaking The Symmetry Of Choice
AbstractGeneralization of the minority game to more than one market is considered. At each time step, every agent chooses one of its strategies and acts on the market related to this strategy. If the payoff function allows for strong fluctuation of utility then market occupancies become inhomogeneous with preference given to this market where the fluctuation occurred first. There exists a critical size of agent population above which agents on bigger market behave collectively. In this regime, there always exists a history of decisions for which all agents on a bigger market react identically.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal Advances in Complex Systems.
Volume (Year): 12 (2009)
Issue (Month): 04 ()
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- Li-Xin Zhong & Wen-Juan Xu & Ping Huang & Chen-Yang Zhong & Tian Qiu, 2013. "Self-organization and phase transition in financial markets with multiple choices," Papers 1312.0690, arXiv.org.
- Wawrzyniak, Karol & Wiślicki, Wojciech, 2012. "Mesoscopic approach to minority games in herd regime," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 391(5), pages 2056-2082.
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