This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

About The Power To Enforce And Prevent Consensus By Manipulating Communication Rules

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
JAN LORENZ () (Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Universität Bremen, Bibliothekstraße, 28359 Bremen, Germany)
DIEMO URBIG () (School of Business and Economics and Department of Computer Science, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, Unter den Linden 6, 10099 Berlin, Germany)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We explore the possibilities of enforcing and preventing consensus in continuous opinion dynamics that result from modifications in the communication rules. We refer to the model of Weisbuch and Deffuant, where n agents adjust their continuous opinions as a result of random pairwise encounters whenever their opinions differ not more than a given bound of confidence ε. A high ε leads to consensus, while a lower ε leads to a fragmentation into several opinion clusters. We drop the random encounter assumption and ask: How small may ε be such that consensus is still possible with a certain communication plan for the entire group? Mathematical analysis shows that ε may be significantly smaller than in the random pairwise case. On the other hand, we ask: How large may ε be such that preventing consensus is still possible? In answering this question, we prove Fortunato's simulation result that consensus cannot be prevented for ε > 0.5 for large groups. Next, we consider opinion dynamics under different individual strategies and examine their power to increase the chances of consensus. One result is that balancing agents increase chances of consensus, especially if the agents are cautious in adapting their opinions. However, curious agents increase chances of consensus only if those agents are not cautious in adapting their opinions.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=pdf&id=pii:S0219525907000982
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
File URL: http://www.worldscinet.com/cgi-bin/details.cgi?type=html&id=pii:S0219525907000982
File Format: text/html
File Function:
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. in its journal Advances in Complex Systems.

Volume (Year): 10 (2007)
Issue (Month): 02 ()
Pages: 251-269
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:wsi:acsxxx:v:10:y:2007:i:02:p:251-269

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.worldscinet.com/acs/acs.shtml

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Tai Tone Lim).

Related research
Keywords: Continuous opinion dynamics; bounded confidence; communication structure; balancing agents; curious agents;

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer for RePEc, for example by providing information about publications in your institution.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-13.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.