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Does corporate ownership structure matter for economic growth? A cross-country analysis

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  • Panayotis Kapopoulos

    (Risk Management Division, Emporiki Bank, Athens, Greece)

  • Sophia Lazaretou

    (Economic Research Department, Bank of Greece, Athens, Greece)

Abstract

The role of corporations in allocating resources has been of great importance in the debate about the manner in which enterprises should be governed to enhance economic growth. Corporate governance features seem to be central to the dynamics by which successful firms and economies improve their performance over time as well as relative to each other. In this paper we try to clarify the relationship between corporate ownership structure and output growth by using the data of La Porta et al. (J. Finance 1999; LIV: 471-517) on ownership structure of large- and medium-sized corporations in 27 economies. To search for empirical linkages, we use cross-country growth regressions. The evidence provided in the paper suggests that an environment with a higher percentage of directly and indirectly widely held companies and a lower degree of state than private ownership is associated with a higher growth rate of per capita income. We also conclude that a higher degree of institutional investment does not seem to enhance the growth performance of an economy. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1442
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

Volume (Year): 30 (2009)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 155-172

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Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:30:y:2009:i:3:p:155-172

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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

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References

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Cited by:
  1. Genberg, Hans, 2006. "Exchange-Rate Arrangements an Financial Integration in East Asia: On a Collision Course?," Working Papers 122, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
  2. George A. Christodoulakis & Stephen E Satchell, 2006. "Exact Elliptical Distributions for Models of Conditionally Random Financial Volatility," Working Papers 32, Bank of Greece.
  3. Eleni Angelopoulou, 2005. "The Comparative Performance of Q-type and Dynamic Models of Firm Investment: Empirical Evidence from the UK," Working Papers 27, Bank of Greece.
  4. P. Swamy & George Tavlas, 2007. "The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and Inflation Expectations: Re-Specification and Interpretation," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 293-306, May.
  5. Alexandros E. Milionis, 2006. "An Alternative Definition of Market Efficiency and some Comments on its Empirical Testing," Working Papers 50, Bank of Greece.
  6. Williamson, John, 2006. "A Worldwide System of Reference Rates," Working Papers 130, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank).
  7. Otmar Issing, 2006. "Europe's Hard Fix: The Euro Area," Working Papers 39, Bank of Greece.
  8. Andreas S. Andreou & George A. Zombanakis, 2006. "Computational Intelligence in Exchange-Rate Forecasting," Working Papers 49, Bank of Greece.

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