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Social norms, coordination and collaboration in heterogeneous teams

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Author Info

  • Marilyne Antonetti

    (Université Nice Sophia - Antipolis, GREDEG-DEMOS-CNRS, France)

  • Alexandra Rufini

    (Université Nice Sophia - Antipolis, GREDEG-DEMOS-CNRS, France)

Abstract

This paper considers the coordinating role of social norms in a heterogeneous team of workers. We define an optimal unit of production as a form of organisation involving several teams and members, with the following properties: (i) a social norm operating to coordinate individual efforts; (ii) a team with heterogeneous skills, enabling generation of synergies. Our model suggests that competences of the best worker are transferred to his or her peers. This collaborative process enhances team efficiency but only if there is an implicit ex ante coordinating device based on social norms that discourage free riding. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1417
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.

Volume (Year): 29 (2008)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
Pages: 547-554

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Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:29:y:2008:i:7:p:547-554

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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976

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  1. Ernst Fehr & Simon G�chter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer.
  2. Che,Y.K. & Yoo,S.W., 1998. "Optimal incentives for teams," Working papers 8, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00179979 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Barton H. Hamilton & Jack A. Nickerson & Hideo Owan, 2003. "Team Incentives and Worker Heterogeneity: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Teams on Productivity and Participation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 111(3), pages 465-497, June.
  5. Hong, Lu & Page, Scott E., 2001. "Problem Solving by Heterogeneous Agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(1), pages 123-163, March.
  6. Claude Meidinger & Jean-Louis Rullière & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems When Agents Vary in Their Ability?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 253-272, November.
  7. Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Papers 90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
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