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An experimental examination of demand reduction in multi-unit versions of the Uniform-price, Vickrey, and English auctions

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  • David Porter

    (Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason University, USA)

  • Roumen Vragov

    (Baruch College City, University of New York, USA)

Abstract

Demand reduction in Uniform-price and English auctions are strategic reactions by participants to reduce price and thus increase potential profits. Laboratory experiments similar to the field experiments performed by List and Reiley (Am. Econ. Rev. 2000; 9 (4): 961-972) in which two individuals with demands for two units vie for two units through a Uniform-price, English or Vickrey auction are conducted. We find strong support for demand reduction in both the English and Uniform-price auctions, with significantly more dramatic reductions in the English auction. However, there is significant overbidding in both the Vickrey and Uniform-price auction. This overbidding solves a puzzle found by List and Reiley in their field experiment data. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • David Porter & Roumen Vragov, 2006. "An experimental examination of demand reduction in multi-unit versions of the Uniform-price, Vickrey, and English auctions," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(6), pages 445-458.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:27:y:2006:i:6:p:445-458
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.1281
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert Forsythe & R. Mark Isaac & Thomas R. Palfrey, 1989. "Theories and Tests of "Blind Bidding" in Sealed-Bid Auctions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(2), pages 214-238, Summer.
    2. Lawrence M. Ausubel & Peter Cramton & Marek Pycia & Marzena Rostek & Marek Weretka, 2014. "Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 81(4), pages 1366-1400.
    3. John A. List & David Lucking-Reiley, 2002. "Bidding Behavior and Decision Costs in Field Experiments," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 40(4), pages 611-619, October.
    4. Rothkopf, Michael H & Teisberg, Thomas J & Kahn, Edward P, 1990. "Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(1), pages 94-109, February.
    5. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 2001. "Behavior in Multi-unit Demand Auctions: Experiments with Uniform Price and Dynamic Vickrey Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 413-454, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sherstyuk, Katerina, 2008. "Some Results on Anti-Competitive Behavior in Multi-Unit Ascending Price Auctions," Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, in: Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith (ed.), Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 23, pages 185-198, Elsevier.
    2. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans & John A. List & David H. Reiley, 2005. "Demand Reduction in Multi-Unit Auctions: Evidence from a Sportscard Field Experiment: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 472-476, March.
    3. List, John A. & Reiley, David, 2008. "Field Experiments in Economics: Palgrave Entry," IZA Discussion Papers 3273, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    4. Abel M. Winn & Michael L. Parente & David Porter, 2016. "Seller Beware: Supply and Demand Reduction and Price Manipulation in Multiple‐Unit Uniform Price Auctions," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(3), pages 760-780, January.
    5. Kagel, John H. & Levin, Dan, 2009. "Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 221-237, May.
    6. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2009. "Bidding Behaviour in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(537), pages 855-882, April.
    7. Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2014. "Divisible-good uniform price auctions: The role of allocation rules and communication among bidders," Research in Experimental Economics, in: Sean M. Collins & R. Mark Isaac & Douglas A. Norton (ed.), Experiments in Financial Economics, volume 16, pages 53-86, Emerald Publishing Ltd.
    8. List John A., 2007. "Field Experiments: A Bridge between Lab and Naturally Occurring Data," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 5(2), pages 1-47, April.
    9. Yiakoumi, Despina & Rouaix, Agathe & Phimister, Euan, 2022. "Evaluating capacity auction design for electricity: An experimental analysis," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 115(C).
    10. Dallas Burtraw & Jacob Goeree & Charles A. Holt & Erica Myers & Karen Palmer & William Shobe, 2009. "Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 28(4), pages 672-691.
    11. Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2022. "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: an experiment for the Vickrey auction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 902-941, June.
    12. Raphaële Préget & Sophie Thoyer, 2009. "Multi-Unit Auctions and Competition Stricture," Working Papers 09-18, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Dec 2009.
    13. Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020. "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper 1109, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    14. Anthony M. Kwasnica & Katerina Sherstyuk, 2013. "Multiunit Auctions," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 27(3), pages 461-490, July.
    15. Takehito Masuda & Ryo Mikami & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2020. "The net effect of advice on strategy-proof mechanisms: An experiment for the Vickrey auction," ISER Discussion Paper 1109r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised May 2021.
    16. Dirk Engelmann & Veronika Grimm, 2003. "Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions - An Experimental Investigation and some Theoretical Insights," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp210, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    17. Ahlberg , Joakim, 2012. "Multi-unit common value auctions: a laboratory experiment with three sealed-bid mechanisms," Working papers in Transport Economics 2012:23, CTS - Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
    18. Takehito Masuda & Toyotaka Sakai & Shigehiro Serizawa & Takuma Wakayama, 2019. "A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction," ISER Discussion Paper 1048r, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University, revised Nov 2019.
    19. Cong, Rong-Gang & Wei, Yi-Ming, 2012. "Experimental comparison of impact of auction format on carbon allowance market," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 16(6), pages 4148-4156.

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