Enron, corporate governance and deterrence
Abstract
In this paper, I investigate the lessons from the financial scandals surrounding companies like Enron and WorldCom. These companies have generated concerns leading to the legal reform of corporate governance in America, and to the revision of voluntary, self-regulatory codes in Europe. The passage of time since the Enron debacle shows that critics were too quick to criticize, since the required adjustments have more the nature of minor adjustments to regulations. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.Download Info
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Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics.
Volume (Year): 26 (2005)
Issue (Month): 7 ()
Pages: 421-429
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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Ramello, Giovanni B. & Porrini, Donatella, 2010.
"Class action and financial markets: Insights from law and economics,"
POLIS Working Papers
143, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
- Donatella Porrini & Giovanni B. Ramello, 2011. "Class action and financial markets: insights from law and economics," Journal of Financial Economic Policy, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 3(2), pages 140-160, July.
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