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The effects of ownership concentration on investment and performance in privatized firms in Russia Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Igor Filatotchev (Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet Street, London, UK)
Rostislav Kapelyushnikov (The Russian Economic Barometer, Moscow, Russian Federation)
Natalya Dyomina (The Russian Economic Barometer, Moscow, Russian Federation)
Sergey Aukutsionek (The Russian Economic Barometer, Moscow, Russian Federation)
This paper provides new survey evidence on effects of concentrated ownership on restructuring and performance in privatized firms in Russia. The major findings are that large-block shareholding is negatively associated with the firm's investment and performance, and this relationship does not depend on the identity of controlling shareholders. These results are consistent with the assumption that when minority shareholders' rights are not adequately protected, the entrenched controlling shareholders may be engaged in extracting 'control premium' before pro rata distribution of dividends. The issues raised have relevance to other transitional economies where the privatization process has been followed by an increase in ownership concentration. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Managerial and Decision Economics .
Volume (Year): 22 (2001)
Issue (Month): 6 ()
Pages: 299-313
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Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:299-313Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Pound, John, 1988.
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"Investor protection and corporate governance ,"
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"Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control and Economic Growth ,"
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209, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School.
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Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008.
"Corporate Governance, Ownership Structures and Investment in Transition Economies: the Case of Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan ,"
Working Papers
w0119, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
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