IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/mgtdec/v22y2001i6p299-313.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The effects of ownership concentration on investment and performance in privatized firms in Russia

Author

Listed:
  • Igor Filatotchev

    (Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet Street, London, UK)

  • Rostislav Kapelyushnikov

    (The Russian Economic Barometer, Moscow, Russian Federation)

  • Natalya Dyomina

    (The Russian Economic Barometer, Moscow, Russian Federation)

  • Sergey Aukutsionek

    (The Russian Economic Barometer, Moscow, Russian Federation)

Abstract

This paper provides new survey evidence on effects of concentrated ownership on restructuring and performance in privatized firms in Russia. The major findings are that large-block shareholding is negatively associated with the firm's investment and performance, and this relationship does not depend on the identity of controlling shareholders. These results are consistent with the assumption that when minority shareholders' rights are not adequately protected, the entrenched controlling shareholders may be engaged in extracting 'control premium' before pro rata distribution of dividends. The issues raised have relevance to other transitional economies where the privatization process has been followed by an increase in ownership concentration. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Suggested Citation

  • Igor Filatotchev & Rostislav Kapelyushnikov & Natalya Dyomina & Sergey Aukutsionek, 2001. "The effects of ownership concentration on investment and performance in privatized firms in Russia," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(6), pages 299-313.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:299-313
    DOI: 10.1002/mde.1008
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1002/mde.1008
    File Function: Link to full text; subscription required
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/mde.1008?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 1999. "A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control," NBER Working Papers 7203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 2000. "Investor protection and corporate governance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 3-27.
    3. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    4. Randall K. Morck & David A. Strangeland & Bernard Yeung, 1998. "Inherited Wealth, Corporate Control and Economic Growth," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 209, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    5. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    7. Estrin, Saul & Wright, Mike, 1999. "Corporate Governance in the Former Soviet Union: An Overview," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 398-421, September.
    8. Estrin, Saul & Wright, Mike, 1999. "Corporate Governance in the Former Soviet Union," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 395-397, September.
    9. Ernst Maug, 1998. "Large Shareholders as Monitors: Is There a Trade-Off between Liquidity and Control?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 53(1), pages 65-98, February.
    10. Igor Filatotchev & Mike Wright & Michael Bleaney, 1999. "Privatization, insider control and managerial entrenchment in Russia," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 7(2), pages 481-504, July.
    11. Short, Helen, 1994. "Ownership, Control, Financial Structure and the Performance of Firms," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(3), pages 203-249, September.
    12. Pound, John, 1988. "Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 237-265, January.
    13. Bennedsen, Morten & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2000. "The balance of power in closely held corporations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1-2), pages 113-139.
    14. Franco Modigliani & Enrico Perotti, 1997. "Protection of minority interest and the development of security markets," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(7-8), pages 519-528.
    15. Sergei Aukutsionek & Igor Filatochev & Rostislav Kapelyushnikov & Vladimir Zhukov, 1998. "Dominant shareholders, restructuring and performance of privatised companies in Russia: An analysis and some policy implications," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(4), pages 495-517.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Kate Bishop & Igor Filatotchev & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2002. "Endogenous ownership structure: factors affecting the post-privatisation equity in largest Hungarian firms," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 5, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    2. Lai, Shaojie & Liang, Hongyan & Liu, Zilong & Pu, Xiaoling & Zhang, Jianing, 2022. "Ownership concentration among entrepreneurial firms: The growth-control trade-off," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 122-140.
    3. Elisabete Duarte Neves, 2014. "Ownership Structure and Investor¡¯s Sentiments for Dividends," International Journal of Financial Research, International Journal of Financial Research, Sciedu Press, vol. 5(2), pages 35-58, April.
    4. Lili Kang & Fei Peng & Yu Zhu & An Pan, 2018. "Harmony in Diversity: Can the One Belt One Road Initiative Promote China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(9), pages 1-28, September.
    5. Huang, Wei & Jiang, Fuxiu & Liu, Zhibiao & Zhang, Min, 2011. "Agency cost, top executives' overconfidence, and investment-cash flow sensitivity -- Evidence from listed companies in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 261-277, June.
    6. Matyukha, Andriy, 2017. "Business groups in agriculture. Impact of ownership structures on performance: The case of Russia's agroholdings," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Transition Economies, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO), volume 85, number 85.
    7. Michael N. Young & Mike W. Peng & David Ahlstrom & Garry D. Bruton & Yi Jiang, 2008. "Corporate Governance in Emerging Economies: A Review of the Principal–Principal Perspective," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(1), pages 196-220, January.
    8. Bersant Hobdari, 2008. "Insider Ownership and Capital Constraints: An Empirical Investigation of the Credit Rationing Hypothesis in Estonia," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(6), pages 536-549, November.
    9. Olga Lazareva & Andrei Rachinsky & Sergey Stepanov, 2008. "Corporate Governance, Ownership Structures and Investment in Transition Economies: the Case of Russia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan," Working Papers w0119, New Economic School (NES).
    10. Salla Pöyry & Benjamin Maury, 2010. "Influential ownership and capital structure," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 31(5), pages 311-324.
    11. Ichiro Iwasaki, 2007. "Enterprise Reform And Corporate Governance In Russia: A Quantitative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(5), pages 849-902, December.
    12. Krishna Dayal Pandey & Tarak Nath Sahu, 2019. "Concentrated Promoters’ Ownership and Firm Value: Re-examining the Monitoring and Expropriation Hypothesis," Paradigm, , vol. 23(1), pages 70-82, June.
    13. Iwasaki, Ichiro & 岩﨑, 一郎, 2016. "The Evolution of Corporate Governance in the Global Financial Crisis : The Case of Russian Industrial Firms," CEI Working Paper Series 2016-7, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
    14. Pyung K. Kang & Yoo Chan Kim, 2015. "The Impact of the Ownership Discrepancy Between Cash-Flow Rights and Voting Rights on Firms’ Soft Asset Investment Decisions: Evidence from Large Business Groups in South Korea," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 24(3), pages 429-450, May.
    15. Wang, Jiangyuan & Wang, Hua & Wang, Di, 2021. "Equity concentration and investment efficiency of energy companies in China: Evidence based on the shock of deregulation of QFIIs," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    16. Mike Wright & Igor Filatotchev & Robert E. Hoskisson & Mike W. Peng, 2005. "Strategy Research in Emerging Economies: Challenging the Conventional Wisdom," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(1), pages 1-33, January.
    17. Saul Estrin & Svetlana Poukliakova & Daniel Shapiro, 2009. "The Performance Effects of Business Groups in Russia," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 393-420, May.
    18. Igor Filatotchev & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2001. "Ownership Concentration, 'Private Benefits of Control' and Debt Financing," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 4, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Igor Filatotchev & Tomasz Mickiewicz, 2001. "Ownership Concentration, 'Private Benefits of Control' and Debt Financing," UCL SSEES Economics and Business working paper series 4, UCL School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES).
    2. Igor Filatotchev & Yung-Chih Lien & Jenifer Piesse, 2005. "Corporate Governance and Performance in Publicly Listed, Family-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Taiwan," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 257-283, September.
    3. Goergen, Marc & Manjon, Miguel C. & Renneboog, Luc, 2008. "Recent developments in German corporate governance," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 175-193, September.
    4. San Martin-Reyna, J.M. & Duran-Encalada, Jorge A., 2012. "The relationship among family business, corporate governance and firm performance: Evidence from the Mexican stock exchange," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 106-117.
    5. Zorica Kalezić, 2015. "Ownership Concentration and Firm Performance in Transition Economies: Evidence from Montenegro," Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, Central bank of Montenegro, vol. 4(3), pages 5-64.
    6. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 2002. "Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(3), pages 1147-1170, June.
    7. Bernard Yeung & Randall Morck & Daniel Wolfenzon, 2004. "Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth," Working Papers 04-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    8. Shleifer, Andrei & Wolfenzon, Daniel, 2002. "Investor protection and equity markets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 3-27, October.
    9. Attiya Y. Javid & Robina Iqbal, 2010. "Corporate Governance in Pakistan : Corporate Valuation, Ownership and Financing," Governance Working Papers 22830, East Asian Bureau of Economic Research.
    10. Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, 2002. "Institutional Investors, Corporate Ownership, and Corporate Governance: Global Perspectives," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-09, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    11. Zeineb Barka & Taher Hamza, 2020. "The effect of large controlling shareholders on equity prices in France: monitoring or entrenchment?," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 24(3), pages 769-798, September.
    12. Ehrhardt, Olaf & Nowak, Eric, 2001. "Private benefits and minority shareholder expropriation: Empirical evidence from IPOs of German family-owned firms," CFS Working Paper Series 2001/10, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).
    13. Gregorio Sánchez‐Marín & María Encarnación Lucas‐Pérez & Samuel Baixauli‐Soler & Brian G.M. Main & Antonio Mínguez‐Vera, 2022. "Excess executive compensation and corporate governance in the United Kingdom and Spain: A comparative analysis," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 43(7), pages 2817-2837, October.
    14. Renneboog, L.D.R. & Trojanowski, G., 2002. "The Managerial Labor Market and the Governance Role of Shareholder Control Structures in the UK," Discussion Paper 2002-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    15. Sabri Boubaker & Hind Sami, 2011. "Multiple large shareholders and earnings informativeness," Review of Accounting and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 10(3), pages 246-266, August.
    16. Pursey Heugens & Marc Essen & J. Oosterhout, 2009. "Meta-analyzing ownership concentration and firm performance in Asia: Towards a more fine-grained understanding," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 481-512, September.
    17. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    18. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 1999. "Investor Protection: Origins, Consequences, Reform," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1883, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    19. Jean-Jacques Hamon, 2001. "La répartition des droits de vote, leur exercice et l’efficacité économique," Revue d'Économie Financière, Programme National Persée, vol. 63(3), pages 175-209.
    20. Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2008. "Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 21(2), pages 579-604, April.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:mgtdec:v:22:y:2001:i:6:p:299-313. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/7976 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.