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Government allocation of property rights: Who gets what?

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  • Elizabeth S. Rolph

    (Researcher in the Political Science Department at the Rand Corporation)

Abstract

It is widely believed that regulatory programs that confer property rights in the United States represent a device for transferring income from those with less political power to those with more. An analysis of twelve regulatory programs that confer such rights shows that programs do define and allocate property rights according to clearly visible rules; but the rules work to support the economic status quo. To satisfy this paramount political objective, policymakers may sacrifice efficiency. But there is no evidence that they intend these programs to shift wealth from a weaker to a stronger group.

Suggested Citation

  • Elizabeth S. Rolph, 1983. "Government allocation of property rights: Who gets what?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 3(1), pages 45-61.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jpamgt:v:3:y:1983:i:1:p:45-61
    DOI: 10.2307/3324004
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    Cited by:

    1. Woerdman, Edwin, 2001. "Emissions trading and transaction costs: analyzing the flaws in the discussion," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 293-304, August.
    2. Elinor Ostrom, 1989. "Microconstitutional Change in Multiconstitutional Political Systems," Rationality and Society, , vol. 1(1), pages 11-50, July.
    3. Edwin Woerdman, 2000. "Competitive Distortions In An International Emissions Trading Market," Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 337-360, December.

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