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Conditionality When Donor And Recipient Preferences Vary

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  • HOWARD WHITE

    (Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, The Netherlands)

  • OLIVER MORRISSEY

    (CREDIT and Department of Economics, University of Nottingham, UK)

Abstract

An extensive literature evaluates the content of conditionality, but the design of conditionality has received less attention. This paper presents a general framework of conditionality, which allows donor and recipient preferences for policy reform and aid to vary, in which previous contributions are incorporated as specific cases. The general approach allows for conditionality as bargaining between donors and recipients: cases where donors impose conditions on unwilling recipients; cases where recipients are willing but unable to implement all conditions; and situations where recipients and donors are clearly in conflict. Ex ante conditionality is shown to be ineffective in promoting reform in all cases and often counter-productive, either inhibiting the reform efforts of sincere governments or undermining its own credibility by encouraging donors to condone slippage. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Journal of International Development.

Volume (Year): 9 (1997)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 497-505

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Handle: RePEc:wly:jintdv:v:9:y:1997:i:4:p:497-505

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Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/journal/5102/home

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  1. Oliver Morrissey,, . "Politics and Economic Policy Reform: Trade Liberalisation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Journal of International Development, 7:4, 1995, pp.599-618)," Discussion Papers 95/10, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
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Cited by:
  1. Oliver Morrissey & Mark McGillivray, 2010. "Fiscal Effects of Aid," Working Papers id:3194, eSocialSciences.
  2. Pincin, Jared, 2012. "Foreign aid and political influence of the development assistance committee countries," MPRA Paper 39668, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Paul Clist & Alessia Isopi & Oliver Morrissey, . "Selectivity on Aid Modality: Determinants of Budget Support from Multilateral Donors," Discussion Papers 11/01, University of Nottingham, CREDIT.
  4. Mark McGillivray & Oliver Morrissey, 2000. "Aid fungibility in Assessing Aid: red herring or true concern?," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(3), pages 413-428.
  5. Axel Dreher, 2008. "IMF Conditionality: Theory and Evidence," KOF Working papers 08-188, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  6. Morrissey, Oliver, 2002. "Making Debt Relief Conditionality Pro-Poor," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  7. Morrissey, Oliver, 2002. "Recipient Governments' Willingness and Ability to Meet Aid Conditionality: The Effectiveness of Aid Finance and Conditions," Working Paper Series UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  8. Kanbur, Ravi, 2006. "The economics of international aid," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier.
  9. Oliver Morrissey, 2011. "Comment on Mosley (2010): Trust and conditionality, or can the World Bank Leopard change its spots," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 6(3), pages 453-456, September.
  10. Michaelowa, Katharina, 2003. " The Political Economy of the Enhanced HIPC-Initiative," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 114(3-4), pages 461-76, March.
  11. Kalonga Stambuli, 2002. "Political Change, Economic Transition and Catalysis of IMF and World Bank Models - the case of Malawi," Macroeconomics 0211003, EconWPA.
  12. Stefan Koeberle & Harold Bedoya & Peter Silarszky & Gero Verheyen, 2005. "Conditionality Revisited : Concepts, Experiences, and Lessons," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 7346, October.

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