This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Uncompensated Hospital Care: Charitable Mission or Profitable Business Decision?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Dwayne A. Banks (Assistant Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, University of California at Berkeley)
Mary Paterson (Associate Research Scientist, Department of Public Health, Oregon State University)
Jeanne Wendel (Professor, Department of Economics, University of Nevada, Reno)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Provision of hospital uncompensated care is generally assumed to be adversely affected as increased healthcare competition decreases demand for compensated hospital services. Economic theory, however, suggests the question is more complex. Non-profit hospitals are assumed in this paper to maximize utility as a function of uncompensated care, subject to the constraint that revenues cover costs. For-profit hospitals, in contrast, are assumed to maximize profit while recognizing that failure to meet community expectations regarding provision of uncompensated care could negatively impact profits. Therefore, for-profit hospital supply of uncompensated care focuses on balancing the hospital's marginal costs and marginal benefits. These models predict that non-profit hospitals will respond to increased competition by reducing the supply of uncompensated care. In contrast, for-profit hospitals will increase the supply of uncompensated care when market demand decreases since the concurrent decrease in compensated care reduces the marginal cost of producing uncompensated care. The models also predict that for-profit hospitals will respond to changes in community expectations regarding the provision of uncompensated care. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Health Economics.

Volume (Year): 6 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 133-143
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:wly:hlthec:v:6:y:1997:i:2:p:133-143

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Joy M. Grossman Dwayne A. Banks, 1998. "Unrestricted Entry and Nonprice Competition: The Case of Technological Adoption in Hospitals," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 5(2), pages 223-245, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You may want to explore EconPapers, which displays the same data as IDEAS in a different way.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-30.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.