How profitable is risk selection? A comparison of four risk adjustment models
AbstractTo mitigate selection triggered by capitation payments, risk-adjustment models bring capitation payments closer on average to individuals' expected expenditure. We examine the maximum potential profit that plans could hypothetically gain by using their own private information to select low-cost enrollees when payments are made using four commonly used risk adjustment models. Simulations using a privately insured sample suggest that risk selection profits remain substantial. The magnitude of potential profit varies according to the risk adjustment model and the private information plans can employ to identify profitable enrollees. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Health Economics.
Volume (Year): 11 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/jhome/5749
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Selden, Thomas M, 1998. "Risk Adjustment for Health Insurance: Theory and Implications," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 17(2), pages 167-79, November.
- Van de ven, Wynand P.M.M. & Ellis, Randall P., 2000. "Risk adjustment in competitive health plan markets," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 14, pages 755-845 Elsevier.
- Arlene Ash & Randall P. Ellis & Gregory Pope & John Ayanian & David Bates & Helen Burstin & Lisa Iezzoni & Elizabeth McKay & Wei Yu, 2000. "Using Diagnoses to Describe Populations and Predict Costs," Papers 0099, Boston University - Industry Studies Programme.
- Erik van Barneveld & Leida Lamers & René van Vliet & Wynand van de Ven, 2000. "Ignoring small predictable profits and losses: a new approach for measuring incentives for cream skimming," Health Care Management Science, Springer, vol. 3(2), pages 131-140, February.
- Thomas G. McGuire & Jacob Glazer, 2000. "Optimal Risk Adjustment in Markets with Adverse Selection: An Application to Managed Care," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 1055-1071, September.
- Mullahy, John, 1998. "Much ado about two: reconsidering retransformation and the two-part model in health econometrics," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-281, June.
- Karen Eggleston & Randall P. Ellis & Mingshan Lu, 2007. "Prevention and Dynamic Risk Adjustment," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2007-023, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Randall P. Ellis & Thomas G. McGuire, 2006.
"Predictability and Predictiveness in Health Care Spending,"
Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series
WP2006-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Ellis, Randall P. & McGuire, Thomas G., 2007. "Predictability and predictiveness in health care spending," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 25-48, January.
- Jan Brosse & Mathias Kifmann, 2013. "Competition in Health Insurance and Premium Regulation," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(1), pages 21-26, 04.
- Karen Eggleston & Anupa Bir, 2009.
"Measuring Selection Incentives in Managed Care: Evidence From the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance Program,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance,
The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 159-175.
- Anupa Bir & Karen Eggleston, 2006. "Measuring Selection Incentives in Managed Care: Evidence from the Massachusetts State Employee Insurance Program," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0605, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
- Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2006.
"Risk Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance – the Case of France,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
1683, CESifo Group Munich.
- Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2006. "Risk Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance - the Case of France," Working Papers 2006_1, York University, Department of Economics.
- Mario JAMETTI & Thomas VON UNGERN-STERNBERG, 2006. "Risk Selection in Natural Disaster Insurance -The Case of France," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du DÃ©partement d'EconomÃ©trie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 06.02, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
- Kathryn Antioch & Michael Walsh, 2004. "The risk-adjusted vision beyond casemix (DRG) funding in Australia," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 95-109, May.
- Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2009.
"Risk selection in natural disaster insurance,"
2009/6, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
- Mario Jametti & Thomas von Ungern-Sternberg, 2010. "Risk Selection in Natural-Disaster Insurance," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 166(2), pages 344-364, June.
- Bauhoff, Sebastian, 2012. "Do health plans risk-select? An audit study on Germany's Social Health Insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(9-10), pages 750-759.
- Beck, Konstantin & Trottmann, Maria & Zweifel, Peter, 2010. "Risk adjustment in health insurance and its long-term effectiveness," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 489-498, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.