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Warm‐glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish

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  • Özgür Evren
  • Stefania Minardi

Abstract

Warm-glow refers to other-serving behavior that is valuable for the actor per se, apart from its social implications. We provide axiomatic foundations for warm-glow by viewing it as a form of preference for larger choice sets, in the sense of the literature on freedom of choice. Specically, an individual who experiences warm-glow prefers the freedom to be sel sh: she values the availability of sel sh options even if she plans to act unsel shly. Our theory also provides foundations for empirically distinguishing between warm-glow and other motivations for prosocial behavior. The implied choice behavior subsumes Riker and Ordeshook (1968) and Andreoni (1990).
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  • Özgür Evren & Stefania Minardi, 2017. "Warm‐glow Giving and Freedom to be Selfish," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 127(603), pages 1381-1409, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:econjl:v:127:y:2017:i:603:p:1381-1409
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/ecoj.2017.127.issue-603
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    Cited by:

    1. Abhinash Borah, 2019. "Voting Expressively," Working Papers 1012, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    2. Panagiotis Andrikopoulos & Nick Webber, 2019. "Understanding time-inconsistent heterogeneous preferences in economics and finance: a practice theory approach," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 282(1), pages 3-26, November.
    3. Kopylov, Igor, 2016. "Canonical utility functions and continuous preference extensions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 32-37.
    4. Renström, Thomas I. & Spataro, Luca & Marsiliani, Laura, 2021. "Can subsidies rather than pollution taxes break the trade-off between economic output and environmental protection?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C).
    5. Ellingsen, Tore & Mohlin, Erik, 2022. "A Model of Social Duties," Working Papers 2022:14, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    6. Yosuke Hashidate, 2018. "Social Image Concern and Reference Point Formation," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1085, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    7. Card. Johnson, Rutherford & Walker II, Eddie G., 2021. "Willingness to Pay for Recreational Land Use in Minnesota," International Journal of Food and Agricultural Economics (IJFAEC), Alanya Alaaddin Keykubat University, Department of Economics and Finance, vol. 9(1), January.
    8. Jonathan Morduch & Ariane Szafarz, 2018. "Earning to Give: Occupational Choice for Effective Altruists," Working Papers CEB 18-017, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    9. Chandrasekher, Madhav, 2018. "Informal commitments in planner–doer games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 201-230.
    10. Nadine Chlaß & Lata Gangadharan & Kristy Jones, 2021. "Charitable giving and intermediation: a principal agent problem with hidden prices," Monash Economics Working Papers 2021-14, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    11. Abhinash Borah, 2021. "Moral Hypocrisy in Social Preferences," Working Papers 53, Ashoka University, Department of Economics.
    12. Metzger, Laura & Günther, Isabel, 2019. "Making an impact? The relevance of information on aid effectiveness for charitable giving. A laboratory experiment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 18-33.
    13. Nadine Chlaß & Lata Gangadharan & Kristy Jones, 2023. "Charitable giving and intermediation: a principal agent problem with hidden prices," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 941-961.
    14. Datu Buyung Agusdinata & Heide Lukosch, 2019. "Supporting Interventions to Reduce Household Greenhouse Gas Emissions: A Transdisciplinary Role-Playing Game Development," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 50(3), pages 359-376, June.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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