Negotiated transfer pricing: Theory and implications for value chains in agribusiness
AbstractIn this article, the author reviews the transfer pricing problem that occurs when trust, the structure of bargaining, relation-specific investment, and complementarities in organizational design affect trading relationships. A literature review focuses on negotiated transfer pricing in the context of both intra- and interfirm transactions. The author analyzes the strategic implications of transfer pricing for organizational design as a result of the imposition of strong informational assumptions without the explicit consideration of the complementary incentives in organizational design. The author review demonstrates that there are practical benefits from addressing these issues, and points to a number of directions for future analysis. [JEL classification: D82, L23, L15, L66] © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Agribusiness 23: 279-292, 2007.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. in its journal Agribusiness.
Volume (Year): 23 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)1520-6297
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco
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