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Aspects Regarding The Profitability Of The Negotiable Pollution Permits (Ii)

Author

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  • Piciu, Gabriela Cornelia

    (Centre for Financial and Monetary Research “Victor Slăvescu”, Romanian Academy)

Abstract

After 2000, the problems regarding the trading of the emissions quotas was only recently of interest for study and research because of the adverse effects which environmental pollution has on the humans, economy, society and nature. Recently, the bulk of environmental protection specialists tried to find an answer to the question: “why did the emissions quota trading became a key component in the reform of the environmental policy”? In order to answer this question, and to provide a consistent basis for the successful evaluation of the environmental reforms, we need to define some notions regarding the optimal allocations of the responsibility checking. The underlying theory of cost profitability – the main basis for the current regulations – is developed and used as one of the main ways to measure and evaluate the existing systems.

Suggested Citation

  • Piciu, Gabriela Cornelia, 2012. "Aspects Regarding The Profitability Of The Negotiable Pollution Permits (Ii)," Studii Financiare (Financial Studies), Centre of Financial and Monetary Research "Victor Slavescu", vol. 16(2), pages 164-173.
    • Handle: RePEc:vls:finstu:v:16:y:2012:i:2:p:164-173
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bohm, Peter & Carlen, Bjorn, 1999. "Emission quota trade among the few: laboratory evidence of joint implementation among committed countries," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 43-66, January.
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    3. Cason, Timothy N. & Gangadharan, Lata & Duke, Charlotte, 2003. "A laboratory study of auctions for reducing non-point source pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(3), pages 446-471, November.
    4. Andrew Muller, R. & Mestelman, Stuart & Spraggon, John & Godby, Rob, 2002. "Can Double Auctions Control Monopoly and Monopsony Power in Emissions Trading Markets?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 70-92, July.
    5. M. Qizilbash, 2001. "Sustainable Development: Concepts and Rankings," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(3), pages 134-161.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    emissions quotas; profitability; internalization of the externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q52 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Pollution Control Adoption and Costs; Distributional Effects; Employment Effects
    • Q56 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environment and Development; Environment and Trade; Sustainability; Environmental Accounts and Accounting; Environmental Equity; Population Growth

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