Rationality and uncertainty
AbstractExperimental psychologists and economists construct an individual or interactive decision situation in the laboratory. They find non-negligible differences between the observed behavior of participants and the theoretically implied behavior. We refer here to the expected utility theory and to strategic equilibrium in non-cooperative game theory. We comment on the question whether rationality, implies these theoretical behaviors and whether the non-negligible differences as above imply that participants in experiments are irrational. We also comment on the relation between rationality and consistency, in particular in situations of uncertainty.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in its journal Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali.
Volume (Year): 120 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Biases; Decision making; Bayesian; Behavioral Economics; Uncertainty;
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