Does Asymmetric Information matter in Competitive Insurance Markets?
AbstractDoes asymmetric information matter in insurance markets? Recent evidence on the automobile insurance market suggests not, rejecting the separating equilibnum of the Rothschild-Stiglitz model. However, I show that a two-penod version of that model can sustain a pooling equilibrium with experience rating which is consistent with the evidence and it mimics the bonus-malus policies of the automobile insurance markets. I also simulate the model showing that under reasonable conditions coordination failures emerge due to multiple equilibria.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Vita e Pensiero, Pubblicazioni dell'Universita' Cattolica del Sacro Cuore in its journal Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali.
Volume (Year): 112 (2004)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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asymmetric infomation; adverse selection; insurance;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies
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