Local Common Property Exploitation with Rewards
AbstractThis paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding that may explain higher coalition participation. In contrast to the existing fishery literature on coalition formation, all players are assumed ex ante homogenous but may differ ex post due to the cost advantage. A stable equilibrium with cooperation can be reached and a moderate exploitation level can be sustained compared to the ‘‘tragedy of the commons’’ outcome.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.
Volume (Year): 85 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
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Web page: http://le.uwpress.org/
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- Q24 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Land
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- Anne Johannesen & Anders Skonhoft, 2011. "Livestock as Insurance and Social Status: Evidence from Reindeer Herding in Norway," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 48(4), pages 679-694, April.
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