Marine protected areas (MPAs) can positively impact upon marine biodiversity and fisheries returns. Increased fish densities inside MPAs can positively affect catches outside these areas. We examine MPA placement in a transboundary fishery when nations are, and are not, cooperative. We apply a differential game using a bioeconomic model to analyze behavior in MPA placement and effects on effort and biomass in two nations if both nations implement an MPA. Absence of cooperation can result in a prisoners’ dilemma in MPA placement. Strategic interactions lead to a divergence between socially or ecologically optimal MPAs and those chosen by national governments.
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Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.