Reconsidering the Initial Allocation of ITQs: The Search for a Pareto-Safe Allocation between Fishing and Processing Sectors
AbstractAdvancement of rights-based fishing is stymied by industry and congressional concern over distributional issues arising out of traditional ITQ design. This paper examines the existence and policy feasibility of two alternative initial allocations intended to leave the two principal industry participants, the fishers and processors, no worse off, while maximizing efficiency. Market structure is shown to be a critical consideration, not only to avoid unintended wealth redistribution, but also to achieve efficiency.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.
Volume (Year): 75 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://le.uwpress.org/
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- Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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- Matulich, Scott C. & Sever, Murat & Inaba, Frederick S., 2001. "Fishery Cooperatives As An Alternative To Itqs: Implications Of The American Fisheries Act," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 16(1).
- Fell, Harrison, 2008.
"Ex-vessel Pricing and IFQs: A Strategic Approach,"
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- Eggert, Håkan & Tveterås, Ragnar, 2004. "Potential Rent and Overcapacity in the Swedish Baltic Sea Trawl Fishery," Working Papers in Economics 152, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Matulich, Scott C. & Clark, Michael L., 2003. "North Pacific Halibut And Sablefish Ifq Policy Design: Quantifying The Impacts On Processors," Marine Resource Economics, Marine Resources Foundation, vol. 18(2).
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