Advancement of rights-based fishing is stymied by industry and congressional concern over distributional issues arising out of traditional ITQ design. This paper examines the existence and policy feasibility of two alternative initial allocations intended to leave the two principal industry participants, the fishers and processors, no worse off, while maximizing efficiency. Market structure is shown to be a critical consideration, not only to avoid unintended wealth redistribution, but also to achieve efficiency.
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Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
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