Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Mobile Flows, Storage, and Self-Organized Institutions for Governing Common-Pool Resources

Contents:

Author Info

  • Edella Schlager
  • William Blomquist
  • Shui Yan Tang
Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    Common-pool resources (CPR) are treated as if they were fully described by two characteristics-difficulty of exclusion and subtractability of yield. We focus upon two additional characteristics, mobile flows and storage in the resource. In examining CPR settings involving fisheries, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins, we find that users of these resources pursue different strategies and design different institutional arrangements depending upon whether the resource is characterized by mobile flows and/or storage. From this evidence, we develop a typology of CPRs that is useful for understanding and anticipating resource users' strategies in confronting and solving common-pool problems.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3146531
    Download Restriction: A subscripton is required to access pdf files. Pay per article is available.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.

    Volume (Year): 70 (1994)
    Issue (Month): 3 ()
    Pages: 294-317

    as in new window
    Handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:70:y:1994:i:3:p:294-317

    Contact details of provider:
    Web page: http://le.uwpress.org/

    Related research

    Keywords:

    References

    No references listed on IDEAS
    You can help add them by filling out this form.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. Sarker, Ashutosh & Ross, Helen & Shrestha, Krishna K., 2008. "A common-pool resource approach for water quality management: An Australian case study," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 68(1-2), pages 461-471, December.
    2. Elinor Ostrom, 2008. "A Polycentric Approach For Coping With Climate Change," CEMA Working Papers 578, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics.
    3. Poteete, Amy R. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2008. "Fifteen Years of Empirical Research on Collective Action in Natural Resource Management: Struggling to Build Large-N Databases Based on Qualitative Research," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 176-195, January.
    4. Huang, Qiuqiong & Liu, Yang & Rozelle, Scott & Polasky, Stephen & Wang, Jingxia, 2009. "The Effects of Well Management and the Nature of the Aquifer on Groundwater Resources," 2009 Conference, August 16-22, 2009, Beijing, China 49920, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
    5. Basurto, Xavier & Coleman, Eric, 2010. "Institutional and ecological interplay for successful self-governance of community-based fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(5), pages 1094-1103, March.
    6. Janssen, Marco A. & Bousquet, Fran├žois & Cardenas, Juan-Camilo & Castillo, Daniel & Worrapimphong, Kobchai, 2013. "Breaking the elected rules in a field experiment on forestry resources," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 132-139.
    7. G.Ananda Vadivelu, 2011. "Evolution of Property Rights Regimes in the Groundwater Economy of India-Constraints on Moving Towards a Common Property Regime," Working Papers id:4432, eSocialSciences.
    8. Paavola, Jouni & Adger, W. Neil, 2005. "Institutional ecological economics," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 353-368, May.
    9. Elinor Ostrom, 2004. "The Working Parts of Rules and How They May Evolve Over Time," Papers on Economics and Evolution 2004-04, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Evolutionary Economics Group.
    10. Sarker, Ashutosh & Itoh, Tadao, 2001. "Design principles in long-enduring institutions of Japanese irrigation common-pool resources," Agricultural Water Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 89-102, June.
    11. Julia Schindler, 2012. "Rethinking the Tragedy of the Commons: The Integration of Socio-Psychological Dispositions," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 15(1), pages 4.
    12. Paavola, Jouni, 2007. "Institutions and environmental governance: A reconceptualization," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(1), pages 93-103, June.
    13. Steiger, Eva-Maria & Zultan, Ro'i, 2014. "See no evil: Information chains and reciprocity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 1-12.
    14. Anderson White, T. & Ford Runge, C., 1995. "The emergence and evolution of collective action: Lessons from watershed management in Haiti," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 23(10), pages 1683-1698, October.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:uwp:landec:v:70:y:1994:i:3:p:294-317. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.