Auctions and Alternative Procedures for Allocating Pollution Rights
AbstractThe present paper investigates the political feasibility of policies to control pollution and fishing. It first hypothesizes the following: when common or usufruct property rights are changed to full ownership, the new policy is not an unadulterated ...
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Land Economics.
Volume (Year): 58 (1982)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
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