1. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1992. "Collective Labor Supply and Welfare," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 437-67, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
2. François Bourguignon & Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 1993. "Intra Household Allocation of Consumption: A Model and some Evidence from French Data," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 29, pages 08, Janvier-M. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Bourguignon, F. & Browning, M. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Intra Household Allocation of Consumption : A Model and Some Evidence from French Data," DELTA Working Papers 92-08, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
3. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
   • Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 91-08, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
4. Ted Bergstrom, 1995. "A Survey of Theories of the Family," Papers _027, University of Michigan, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ted Bergstrom, 1995. "A Survey of Theories of the Family," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1995D, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   • Bergstrom, T.C., 1993. "A Survey of Theories of the Family," Papers 93-02, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory.
   • Ted Bergstrom, 1994. "A Survey of Theories of the Family," Labor and Demography 9401001, EconWPA, revised 10 Oct 1994. [Downloadable!]
   • Bergstrom, Theodore C., 1993. "A survey of theories of the family," Handbook of Population and Family Economics, in: M. R. Rosenzweig & Stark, O. (ed.), Handbook of Population and Family Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 21-79 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Hoddinott, J. & Haddad, L., 1994. "Does Female Income Share Influence Household Expenditures? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Working Papers Series 94.17, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
   Other versions:
   • Hoddinott, John & Haddad, Lawrence, 1995. "Does Female Income Share Influence Household Expenditures? Evidence from Cote d'Ivoire," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 57(1), pages 77-96, February.
6. Deaton, Angus & Irish, Margaret, 1984. "Statistical models for zero expenditures in household budgets," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 59-80. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Schultz, T.P., 1990. "Testing The Neoclassical Model Of Family Labor Supply And Fertility," Papers 601, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
8. Alderman, H. & Chiappori, P.A. & Haddad, L., 1994. "Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household: Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?," DELTA Working Papers 94-17, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
   Other versions:
   • Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Haddad, Lawrence & Hoddinott, John & Kanbur, Ravi, 1993. "Unitary versus collective models of the household : time to shift theburden of proof?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1217, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
9. Alderman, Harold, et al, 1995. "Unitary versus Collective Models of the Household: Is It Time to Shift the Burden of Proof?," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 1-19, February.
10. Wales, T. J. & Woodland, A. D., 1983. "Estimation of consumer demand systems with binding non-negativity constraints," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 263-285, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Blundell, Richard & Meghir, Costas, 1987. "Bivariate alternatives to the Tobit model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 179-200. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Meghir, Costas & Robin, Jean-Marc, 1992. "Frequency of purchase and the estimation of demand systems," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 53(1-3), pages 53-85. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Deaton, Angus S & Muellbauer, John, 1980. "An Almost Ideal Demand System," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(3), pages 312-26, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
14. Cragg, John G, 1971. "Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables with Application to the Demand for Durable Goods," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(5), pages 829-44, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Thomas, D., 1989. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Papers 586, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
16. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1994. "Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(2), pages 132-37, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-58, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 94-6, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
    Other versions:
    • Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Working Papers 94-6, University of Washington, Department of Economics.

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1. Chris van Klaveren & Bernard van Praag & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2006. "Empirical Estimation Results of a Collective Household Time Allocation Model," IZA Discussion Papers 2107, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Chris van Klaveren & Bernard M.S. van Praag & Henriëtte Maassen van den Brink, 2005. "Empirical Estimation Results of a Collective Household Time Allocation Model," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-096/3, Tinbergen Institute, revised 06 Apr 2006. [Downloadable!]
   • Chris van Klaveren & Bernard M.S. van Praag & Henriette Maassen van den Brink, 2006. "Empirical Estimation Results of a Collective Household Time Allocation Model," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
2. Bütikofer, Aline & Gerfin, Michael, 2009. "The Economies of Scale of Living Together and How They Are Shared: Estimates Based on a Collective Household Model," IZA Discussion Papers 4327, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Aline Bütikofer & Michael Gerfin, 2009. "The economies of scale of living together and how they are shared - Estimates based on a collective household model," Diskussionsschriften dp0903, Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft. [Downloadable!]
3. Nunley, John M. & Seals, Alan, 2009. "Child-Custody Reform and Marriage-Specific Investment in Children," MPRA Paper 16313, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
4. Eriksson, Rickard, 2008. "Is women's non-market time more valuable than men's?," Working Paper Series 2/2008, Swedish Institute for Social Research. [Downloadable!]
5. Robert A. Pollak, 2005. "Bargaining Power in Marriage: Earnings, Wage Rates and Household Production," NBER Working Papers 11239, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Lee, Jungmin, 2004. "Observable and Unobservable Household Sharing Rules: Evidence from Young Couples' Pocket Money," IZA Discussion Papers 1250, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
7. Leora Friedberg & Anthony Webb, 2006. "Determinants and Consequences of Bargaining Power in Households," NBER Working Papers 12367, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Jens Bonke & Hans Uldall-Poulsen, 2007. "Why do families actually pool their income? Evidence from Denmark," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 113-128, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Schady, Norbert & Rosero, Jose, 2007. "Are cash transfers made to women spent like other sources of income?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4282, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Schady, Norbert & Rosero, José, 2008. "Are cash transfers made to women spent like other sources of income?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(3), pages 246-248, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)