An Economic Analysis of the Operation of Social Security Disability Insurance
AbstractSocial Security Disability Insurance (DI) is federally financed but state administered. States vary widely both in benefit application rates and the rates at which applications are denied. Since the decision to apply depends on the likelihood of qualifying for benefits and since denial rates are influenced by a state's applicant pool, a simultaneous model of application and denial rates is developed in this paper. In addition, recent DI funding problems have induced substantial tightening of applicant screening, at least in some states. Estimates are presented which suggest that while this change may have eliminated some unqualified applicants, it is also likely to have increased cross-state inequities in screening.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Wisconsin Press in its journal Journal of Human Resources.
Volume (Year): 17 (1982)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://jhr.uwpress.org/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Gruber, Jonathan & Kubik, Jeffrey D., 1997. "Disability insurance rejection rates and the labor supply of older workers," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 1-23, April.
- Lucie Schmidt, 2013. "The New Safety Net? Supplemental Security Income after Welfare Reform," Department of Economics Working Papers, Department of Economics, Williams College 2013-07, Department of Economics, Williams College.
- Timothy Waidman & John Bound & Austin Nichols, 2003. "Disability Benefits as Social Insurance: Tradeoffs Between Screening Stringency and Benefit Generosity in Optimal Program Design," Working Papers, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center wp042, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center.
- Jonathan Gruber & Jeffrey D. Kubik, 1994. "Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the Labor Supply of Older Workers," NBER Working Papers 4941, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Gruber, 1996.
"Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply,"
NBER Working Papers
5866, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Gruber, 2000. "Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(6), pages 1162-1183, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.