Designing institutions for global security
AbstractThe article merges aspects of alliance theory with bargaining theory and mechanism design. Illustrated with a numeric example, it models a within-alliance neutral agency whose purpose it is to propose an efficient level of public good provision for the alliance as a whole and suggests a mechanism by which to overcome incentives for inefficient provision. The article concludes with an extensive discussion for future research needs on alliance mechanism design, e.g., suggesting that a review of the literatures on central bank design and similar institutions might be helpful.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Economists for Peace and Security (UK) in its journal Economics of Peace and Security Journal.
Volume (Year): 7 (2012)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
Institutions; public goods; alliances; security;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
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