The assassin and the donor as third players in the traditional deterrence game
AbstractWe develop two extensions of the traditional deterrence game to examine the influence of third players, called Assassin and Donor, upon the behavior of a Challenger. The results present the optimal behavior of Challenger when Assassin and Donor are included in the traditional deterrence game. The key result is that Challengers who back down, and thereby activate Assassin or Donor, are more prone to initiate conflict in the first place than are Challengers who escalate, and thereby avoid Assassin or Donor.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Economists for Peace and Security (UK) in its journal Economics of Peace and Security Journal.
Volume (Year): 4 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (July)
deterrence game; game theory.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Dacey Raymond & Carlson Lisa J, 2011. "Aspects of Peace Economics," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1-8, January.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (J Paul Dunne).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.