IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ush/jaessh/v5y2010i4(14)_winter2010p121.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Role Of National And Supranational Fiscal Rules - International Evidence And Situation In The Czech Republic

Author

Listed:
  • Ales MELECKY
  • Martin MACHACEK

Abstract

This paper summarizes recent international evidence on the design, functioning and effects of fiscal rules. Special attention is paid to small open economies such as the Czech Republic. This paper (1) discusses pros and cons of the rules focusing on different types of fiscal constraints (e.g., budget balances, debt, expenditures, and revenue); (2) surveys their impact on key macroeconomic variables; and (3) considers with the efficiency of fiscal rules vis-a-vis the current financial crisis. In this context, representative national and supranational fiscal rules are also reviewed with an emphasis on the enforceability of such rules. This includes an evaluation of (1) the Czech Republic’s fiscal targeting mechanism and medium-term expenditure framework introduced in 2003 and (2) the EU fiscal rules adopted by the Czech Republic in 2004. Finally, current debates on the future of fiscal policy rules inside and outside of the Czech Republic are briefly considered.

Suggested Citation

  • Ales MELECKY & Martin MACHACEK, 2010. "The Role Of National And Supranational Fiscal Rules - International Evidence And Situation In The Czech Republic," Journal of Applied Economic Sciences, Spiru Haret University, Faculty of Financial Management and Accounting Craiova, vol. 5(4(14)/ Wi), pages 375-382.
    • Handle: RePEc:ush:jaessh:v:5:y:2010:i:4(14)_winter2010:p:121
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.jaes.reprograph.ro/articles/winter2010/MeleckyA_MachacekM.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Xavier Debrun & Mr. Manmohan S. Kumar, 2007. "The Discipline-Enhancing Role of Fiscal Institutions: Theory and Empirical Evidence," IMF Working Papers 2007/171, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    3. Perotti, Roberto, 2007. "Fiscal policy in developing countries : a framework and some questions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4365, The World Bank.
    4. Melecky, Martin, 2007. "A cross-country analysis of public debt management strategies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4287, The World Bank.
    5. Mr. George Kopits, 2001. "Fiscal Rules: Useful Policy Framework or Unnecessary Ornament?," IMF Working Papers 2001/145, International Monetary Fund.
    6. Serven, Luis, 2007. "Fiscal rules, public investment, and growth," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4382, The World Bank.
    7. Melecky, Martin, 2009. "The Effect of Institutions, Geography, Development Assistance and Debt Crises on Public-Debt Management," MPRA Paper 16332, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Melecky, Martin, 2012. "Formulation of public debt management strategies: An empirical study of possible drivers," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 218-234.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Carranza-Ugarte, Luis & Díaz-Saavedra, Julián & Galdon-Sanchez, Jose Enrique, 2023. "Rethinking fiscal rules," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 833-857.
      • Luis Carranza Ugarte & Julian Diaz Saavedra & Jose Enrique Galdon-Sanchez, 2021. "Rethinking fiscal rules," ThE Papers 21/14, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
    2. Robert Hagemann, 2011. "How Can Fiscal Councils Strengthen Fiscal Performance?," OECD Journal: Economic Studies, OECD Publishing, vol. 2011(1), pages 1-24.
    3. Robert P. Hagemann, 2010. "Improving Fiscal Performance Through Fiscal Councils," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 829, OECD Publishing.
    4. Yener Altunbaş & John Thornton, 2017. "Why Do Countries Adopt Fiscal Rules?," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 85(1), pages 65-87, January.
    5. Karsten Mause & Friedrich Groeteke, 2012. "New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 279-301, December.
    6. Mr. Jochen R. Andritzky, 2011. "Evaluating Designs for a Fiscal Rule in Bulgaria," IMF Working Papers 2011/272, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Melecky, Ales & Skutova, Marketa, 2011. "Fiskální pravidla v zemích Visegrádské čtyřky [Fiscal Rules in the Visegrad Countries]," MPRA Paper 34028, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Carlos Caceres & Serhan Cevik & Ricardo Fenochietto & Borja Gracia, 2015. "The Day After Tomorrow: Designing an Optimal Fiscal Strategy for Libya," Journal of Banking and Financial Economics, University of Warsaw, Faculty of Management, vol. 2(4), pages 32-50, June.
    9. Rodrigo M. S. Moita & Claudio Paiva, 2013. "Political Price Cycles in Regulated Industries: Theory and Evidence," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 94-121, February.
    10. Anders Gustafsson, 2019. "Busy doing nothing: why politicians implement inefficient policies," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 30(3), pages 282-299, September.
    11. Megan Mullin & Martin D. Smith & Dylan E. McNamara, 2019. "Paying to save the beach: effects of local finance decisions on coastal management," Climatic Change, Springer, vol. 152(2), pages 275-289, January.
    12. Rotunno, Lorenzo, 2016. "Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 133-148.
    13. Ms. Francesca Castellani & Mr. Xavier Debrun, 2001. "Central Bank Independence and the Design of Fiscal Institutions," IMF Working Papers 2001/205, International Monetary Fund.
    14. Tim Besley & Rohini Pande, 1998. "Read my lips: the political economy of information transmission," IFS Working Papers W98/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    15. Jean‐Louis Combes & Xavier Debrun & Alexandru Minea & René Tapsoba, 2018. "Inflation Targeting, Fiscal Rules and the Policy Mix: Cross‐effects and Interactions," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 128(615), pages 2755-2784, November.
    16. Padovano, Fabio & Petrarca, Ilaria, 2014. "Are the responsibility and yardstick competition hypotheses mutually consistent?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 459-477.
    17. Blessing Chiripanhura & Miguel Niño‐Zarazúa, 2015. "Aid, Political Business Cycles and Growth in Africa," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(8), pages 1387-1421, November.
    18. Josef Brechler & Adam Geršl, 2014. "Political legislation cycle in the Czech Republic," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 137-153, June.
    19. Thanh C. Nguyen & Vítor Castro & Justine Wood, 2022. "Political environment and financial crises," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 27(1), pages 417-438, January.
    20. Tonja Jacobi, 2009. "The Role of Politics and Economics in Explaining Variation in Litigation Rates in the U.S. States," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(1), pages 205-233, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal rules; fiscal policy; debt; expenditure framework; Czech Republic;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • O23 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy - - - Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Development

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ush:jaessh:v:5:y:2010:i:4(14)_winter2010:p:121. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Laura Stefanescu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/fmuspro.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.