Partiendo de un modelo de oligopolio mixto en el que las empresas compiten a la Cournot, el objetivo de este trabajo es el de complementar la literatura existente sobre las fusiones horizontales de empresas. En concreto, se matiza la paradoja de las fusiones al probar que ciertas fusiones pueden ser beneficiosas para las empresas fusionadas, aunque no incluyan a la mayor parte de las empresas del mercado. Por otro lado, se demuestra que para que una fusión sea beneficiosa desde el punto de vista del bienestar es necesario que el grado de privatización de la empresa pública sea relativamente bajo.
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Article provided by University of Chile, Department of Economics in its journal Estudios de Economia.
Volume (Year): 34 (2007) Issue (Month): 1 Year 2007 (June) Pages: 37-52 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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Find related papers by JEL classification: L00 - Industrial Organization - - General - - - General L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L33 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise - - - Boundaries of Public and Private Enterprise; Privatization; Contracting Out
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