Unemployment, the Market for Interviews, and Wage Employment
Abstract
A model of equilibrium unemployment and vacancies is presented in which the absence of a market for interviews can yield externalities and inefficiency. Inefficiency results in market forces that lead firms to charge fees for interviews or to change the wage rate. These market forces require substantial information and may not operate. A graphical analysis shows how such forces would cause wages to adjust to shifts in supply, taxes, and transfers between workers and firms. With excessive unemployment, efficiency requires a transfer of income from workers to firms. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 98 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 356-71
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JPE/
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1998.
"Efficient Unemployment Insurance,"
NBER Working Papers
6686, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daron Acemoglu & Robert Shimer, 1999. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 893-928, October.
- Acemoglu, D. & Shimer, R., 1997. "Efficient Unemployment Insurance," Working papers 97-9, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Smith, Tony E & Zenou, Yves, 2001.
"A Discrete-Time Stochastic Model of Job Matching,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3044, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Anthony E. Smith & Yves Zenou, 2003. "A Discrete-Time Stochastic Model of Job Matching," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 54-79, January.
- Holzer, Harry J, 1994.
"Job Vacancy Rates in the Firm: An Empirical Analysis,"
Economica,
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(241), pages 17-36, February.
- Harry J. Holzer, 1990. "Job Vacancy Rates in the Firm: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 3524, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael Sattinger, 2003. "Price Dynamics and the Market for Access to Trading Partners," Discussion Papers 03-10, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.
- Kevin Lang & William T. Dickens, 1993. "Bilateral Search as an Explanation for Labor Market Segmentation and Other Anomalies," NBER Working Papers 4461, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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