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Rationing and Rent Dissipation in the Presence of Heterogeneous Individuals

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Author Info
Suen, Wing

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Abstract

This paper discusses the implications of rationing by waiting when consumers have different time costs and personal valuation. The joint distribution function of time costs and personal valuations is used to characterize market equilibrium. It is argued that, under certain conditions, an increase in the variance of time costs will reduce the dissipation of rent. Furthermore, it is shown that introducing a secondary market for a rationed good does not necessarily improve welfare because total surplus under rationing by waiting depends more on the variance than on the level of time costs and personal valuation. The model is also used to discuss other institutions that involve rent-seeking activities, such as the patent system and import quotas. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 97 (1989)
Issue (Month): 6 (December)
Pages: 1384-94
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:97:y:1989:i:6:p:1384-94

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  1. Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 2007. "Does the Minimum Wage Cause Inefficient Rationing?," NBER Working Papers 13012, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Edward L. Glaeser & Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2003. "The Misallocation of Housing Under Rent Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(4), pages 1027-1046, September. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci & Sander Onderstal & Francesco Parisi, 2009. "Seeking rents in the shadow of Coase," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(1), pages 171-196, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Che, Yeon-Koo & Gale, Ian, 2006. "Market versus Non-Market Assignment of Initial Ownership," MPRA Paper 6095, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 May 2006. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Jeremy Clark & Bonggeun Kim, 2006. "Paying Vs. Waiting in the Pursuit of Specific Egalitarianism," Working Papers in Economics 06/08, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Edward L. Glaeser, 1996. "The Social Costs of Rent Control Revisited," NBER Working Papers 5441, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Terrance Hurley, 1998. "Rent dissipation and efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 289-298, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
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