AbstractSanctions are measures that one party (the sender) uses to influence another (the target). Sanctions, or the threat of sanctions, have been used by governments to alter the human rights, trade, or foreign policies of other governments. The authors develop notions of the sender's and target's toughness that depend on their patience and on the extent of their suffering from sanctions. How much a sender can exact from the target depends on the relative toughness of the two. Sanctions that impose less harm on the target can sometimes be more effective than those that impose greater harm. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 100 (1992)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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Other versions of this item:
- Jonathan Eaton & Maxim Engers, 1990. "Sanctions," NBER Working Papers 3399, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jonathan Eaton & Maxim Engers, 1993. "Sanctions," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 14, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
- Eaton, J. & Engers, M., 1990. "Sanctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0221, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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