Electric utility deregulation associated with the 1992 Energy Policy Act represents a natural experiment for observing linkages between governance structure changes and product market competition. This study finds that governance structures of utilities are enhanced in their ability to control owner-manager agency conflict post-1992, but not by as much as comparable industrial firms. Incomplete utility deregulation leads to competition increases that are not as great as those of industrial firms. Governance structure enhancements of utilities lag behind those of industrial firms. Further deregulation is expected to stimulate competition, leading to governance structures that provide greater control of owner-manager agency conflict.
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 79 (2006) Issue (Month): 4 (July) Pages: 1989-2018 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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