Planned Obsolescence and Social Welfare
AbstractDurable-goods marketing has an obsolescence effect on older models. I consider two cases: commitment (where the decision on how much to invest in marketing is made in the first period) and noncommitment (where the decision is made in the second period). I focus on the fact that the introduction of a higher quality model lowers the utility of consumers using an older model. I show that, in both cases, the equilibrium level of marketing rises above the socially optimal level. The point is that a larger obsolescence effect promotes replacement demand, driving the monopolist to spend more than is socially optimal.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 79 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/
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- Utaka, Atsuo, 2008. "Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 878-888, July.
- Joseph Guiltinan, 2010. "Consumer durables replacement decision-making: An overview and research agenda," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 21(2), pages 163-174, June.
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