Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Market Manipulation and the Role of Insider Trading Regulations

Contents:

Author Info

  • John, Kose
  • Narayanan, Ranga

Abstract

The authors show that the regulation requiring corporate insiders to disclose their trades ex post creates incentives for informed insiders to manipulate the market by sometimes trading against their information. This allows them to increase their trading profits by maintaining their information advantage over the market for a longer period of time. Such manipulation lowers initial bid-ask spreads. The authors show how the insider's likelihood of manipulation is affected by her information advantage, the number of other insiders, market liquidity, the early arrival of public information, and the choice of trade size. The short swing profit rule curtails this manipulation. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-9398%28199704%2970%3A2%3C217%3AMMATRO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E&origin=repec
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.

Volume (Year): 70 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 217-47

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:70:y:1997:i:2:p:217-47

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Lee, Eun Jung & Eom, Kyong Shik & Park, Kyung Suh, 2013. "Microstructure-based manipulation: Strategic behavior and performance of spoofing traders," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 227-252.
  2. Tālis J. Putniņš, 2012. "Market Manipulation: A Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(5), pages 952-967, December.
  3. Archishman Chakraborty & Bilge Yilmaz, . "Informed Manipulation," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 7-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  4. Andrea Buffa & Giovanna Nicodano, 2006. "Should Insider Trading be Prohibited when Share Repurchases are Allowed?," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 16, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  5. Agarwal, Vikas & Mullally, Kevin & Tang, Yuehua & Yang, Baozhong, 2013. "Mandatory portfolio disclosure, stock liquidity, and mutual fund performance," CFR Working Papers 13-04, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
  6. Chi-Wen Lee & Zemin Lu, 2008. "Trading on inside information when there may be tippees," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 31(3), pages 241-260, October.
  7. Matthew Pritsker, 2005. "Large investors: implications for equilibrium asset, returns, shock absorption, and liquidity," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2005-36, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  8. Subrahmanyam, Avanidhar & Titman, Sheridan, 1998. "Feedback from Stock Prices to Cash Flows†(formerly called “Real Effects of Financial Market Trading)," University of California at Los Angeles, Anderson Graduate School of Management qt2hw9m972, Anderson Graduate School of Management, UCLA.
  9. Lee, Cheng-Few & YiLin, Wu, 2009. "Two-stage models for the analysis of information content of equity-selling mechanisms choices," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 123-133, January.
  10. Agarwal, Vikas & Mullally, Kevin Andrew & Tang, Yuehua & Yang, Baozhong, 2014. "Mandatory portfolio disclosure, stock liquidity, and mutual fund performance," CFR Working Papers 13-04 [rev.], University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
  11. Calcagno, R. & Lovo, S.M., 2002. "Market Efficiency and Price Formation When Dealers are Asymmetrically Informed," Discussion Paper 2002-42, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  12. Archishman Chakraborty & Bilge Yilmaz, . "Nested Information and Manipulation in Financial Markets," Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research Working Papers 6-00, Wharton School Rodney L. White Center for Financial Research.
  13. Xiangbo Liu & Zijun Liu & Zhigang Qiu, 2013. "Stock Market Manipulation in the Presence of Fund Flows," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 14(2), pages 483-491, November.
  14. Emilio Barucci & Carlo Bianchi & Alberto Manconi, 2006. "Internal dealing regulation and insiders’ trades in the Italian financial market," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 107-119, September.
  15. Carole Comerton-Forde & James Rydge, 2006. "Market Integrity and Surveillance Effort," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer, vol. 29(2), pages 149-172, April.
  16. Giambona, Erasmo & Golec, Joseph, 2010. "Strategic trading in the wrong direction by a large institutional insider," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 1-22, January.
  17. Chakraborty, Archishman & Yilmaz, Bilge, 2004. "Manipulation in market order models," Journal of Financial Markets, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 187-206, February.
  18. Niemeyer, Jonas, 2001. "Where to Go after the Lamfalussy Report? - An Economic Analysis of Securities Market Regulation and Supervision," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 482, Stockholm School of Economics.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:70:y:1997:i:2:p:217-47. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.