The authors estimate the determinants of shareholder heterogeneity by examining the shareholder responses to fixed-price self-tender offers and two-tier interfirm tender offers. Tendering rates are increased in the cash price relative to the postoffer price of the stock. Proxies for capital gains' tax liabilities also explain tendering rates. Controlling for the cash tender relative to the postoffer price of the stock, the authors find that tendering rates are significantly higher in interfirm tender offers than in self-tender offers, which indicates that shareholders view accepting another firm's stock as an unattractive means of avoiding capital gains. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 65 (1992) Issue (Month): 4 (October) Pages: 529-56 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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