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Author Info
Hall, Christopher D
Abstract

Textbook models fail to explain royalty and fee-pricing arrangements in the patent and trade-secret licenses discussed here. A theory of royalty pricing as an efficient tax and as a performance bond explains more. Royalty taxes help coordinate user outputs to maximize the joint value of a common customer pool. Royalties, by tying owner income to licensee sales directly, also encourage owners to protect rights against infringement over time. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.

Volume (Year): 64 (1991)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 21-48
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jnlbus:v:64:y:1991:i:1:p:21-48

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  1. Josh Lerner & Robert P. Merges, 1997. "The Control of Strategic Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of Biotechnology Collaborations," NBER Working Papers 6014, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dan Elfenbein & Josh Lerner, 2001. "Links and Hyperlinks: An Empirical Analysis of Internet Portal Alliances, 1995-1999," NBER Working Papers 8251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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