Labor Participation in Corporate Policy-Making Decisions: West Germany's Experience with Codetermination
AbstractIf workers are wealth maximizers, codetermination should lead to less risky investments, smaller dividends, reduced firm leverage, higher and more stable salaries, and more capital- intensive production processes. Unless codetermination also increases productivity by raising workers' morale and satisfaction or reduces information asymmetries within the firm, shareholder wealth and firm value will decline. An analysis of West Germany's case, however, indi cates that codetermination has little, if any, effect on corporate op erations and performance. Copyright 1987 by the University of Chicago.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 60 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (October)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JB/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Franziska Boneberg, 2011. "The Economic Consequences of One-third Co-determination in German Supervisory Boards, First Evidence for the Service Sector from a New Source of Enterprise Data," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, Justus-Liebig University Giessen, Department of Statistics and Economics, vol. 231(3), pages 440-457, June.
- Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, 2000.
"Class Struggle Inside the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination,"
Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania
00-36, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, 2000. "Class Struggle Inside the Firm: A Study of German Codetermination," NBER Working Papers 7945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary Gorton & Frank Schmid, 2002. "Class struggle inside the firm: a study of German codetermination," Working Papers, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 2000-025, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Patrick Bolton & Marco Becht & Alisa Röell, 2002.
"Corporate Governance and Control,"
NBER Working Papers
9371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Franziska Boneberg, 2010. "The Economic Consequences of one-third Codetermination in German Supervisory Boards: First Evidence for the Service Sector from a New Source of Enterprise Data," Working Paper Series in Economics 177, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.