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Contracts as Bilateral Commitments: A New Perspective on Contract Modification

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Author Info
Jolls, Christine
Abstract

Contracts have traditionally been regarded as means of individual commitment. This article offers a broader vision, viewing contracts as potential means of bilateral commitment as well. Drawing on a burgeoning literature in economics, this article explains that commitment to stick with an original contract, even if both parties later want to modify that contract, may improve contractors' welfare. It provides examples from contracts cases of situations in which such bilateral commitment may be beneficial, and it suggests ways in which contract law might better facilitate such commitment. The primary suggestion for facilitating bilateral commitment is that parties-at least sophisticated ones-be permitted to enter into nonmodifiable contracts, which they cannot do under existing law. Permitting parties to write nonmodifiable contracts would enhance contractors' welfare in the settings examined in this article and would not interfere with other normative goals of contract law. Copyright 1997 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Legal Studies.

Volume (Year): 26 (1997)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 203-37
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlstud:v:26:y:1997:i:1:p:203-37

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  1. Boockmann, Bernhard & Thurner, Paul W., 2002. "Flexibility Provisions in Multilateral Environmental Treaties," ZEW Discussion Papers 02-44, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
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  2. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," NBER Working Papers 10397, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Simon Schropp, 2007. "Revisiting the "Compliance-vs.-Rebalancing" Debate in WTO Scholarship a Unified Research Agenda," HEI Working Papers 29-2007, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies, revised Dec 2007. [Downloadable!]
  4. Athias, Laure & Saussier, Stéphane, 2007. "Contractual flexibility or rigidity for public private partnerships? Theory and evidence from infrastructure concession contracts," MPRA Paper 10541, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, 2000. "Economic and Legal Aspects of Costly Recontracting," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 2000-05, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2006. "Contracts as Reference Points," NBER Working Papers 12706, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, . "The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1004, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Should Contractual Clauses that Forbid Renegotiation Always be Enforced?," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse26_2005, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Steven Shavell, 2005. "Contracts, Holdup, and Legal Intervention," NBER Working Papers 11284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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