AbstractWitness intimidation involves strategic complexity and two-sided uncertainty: criminals cannot know whether threats will deter witnesses, and witnesses cannot know whether threats will be carried out. We model this interaction and explore how rates of intimidation, testimony, and conviction respond to changes in the value of testimony, relations between the police and the community, and witness protection programs. If the value of testimony rises, criminals face stronger incentives to threaten, but threats are less credible. The increase in threats may be large enough to offset the greater value of testimony, with the paradoxical outcome that fewer criminals are convicted. Counterintuitive results are most likely when witness intimidation is a severe problem: few witnesses testify although prosecutors are competent. When the harm faced by witnesses depends on whether the criminal is convicted, communities can be trapped in equilibria with collective silence: no witness testifies because none expects others to testify.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal The Journal of Legal Studies.
Volume (Year): 39 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 399 - 432
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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLS/
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- Brendan O’Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, 2010.
"Peaceable Kingdoms and War Zones: Preemption, Ballistics and Murder in Newark,"
in: The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America, pages 305-353
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Brendan O'Flaherty & Rajiv Sethi, 2007. "Peaceable kingdoms and war zones: Pre-emption, ballistics and murder in Newark," Discussion Papers 0708-02, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
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