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Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution

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  • MacCulloch, Robert

Abstract

Although property rights are the cornerstone of market economies, throughout history existing claims have been frequently overturned by revolutions. One unsettled question is whether income inequality affects the likelihood of revolt. This paper takes an approach different from previous studies by introducing data derived from two surveys of revolutionary preferences across a quarter-million randomly sampled individuals. More people are found to have a preference for revolt when inequality in their nation is high. A 1-standard-deviation increase in the Gini coefficient explains up to 38 percent of the standard deviation in revolutionary support. The results hold after controlling for a set of personal characteristics and country and year fixed effects. Since higher levels of income are found to have a negative impact on the taste for revolt, the results suggest that either "going for growth" or implementing policies that reduce inequality can buy off those individuals with revolutionary preferences.

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  • MacCulloch, Robert, 2005. "Income Inequality and the Taste for Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(1), pages 93-123, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2005:v:48:i:1:p:93-123
    DOI: 10.1086/426881
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    Cited by:

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    2. Robert MacCulloch & Silvia Pezzini, 2010. "The Roles of Freedom, Growth, and Religion in the Taste for Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 329-358, May.
    3. Camacho, Carmen & Hassan, Waleed, 2023. "The dynamics of revolution: Discrimination, social unrest and the optimal timing of revolution," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 128(C).
    4. Krieger, Tim & Meierrieks, Daniel, 2019. "Income inequality, redistribution and domestic terrorism," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 125-136.
    5. Farzanegan, Mohammad Reza & Krieger, Tim, 2017. "The response of income inequality to positive oil rents shocks in Iran: Implications for the post-sanction period," Discussion Paper Series 2017-04, University of Freiburg, Wilfried Guth Endowed Chair for Constitutional Political Economy and Competition Policy.
    6. Mehdi Shadmehr & Peter Haschke, 2016. "Youth, Revolution, And Repression," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 54(2), pages 778-793, April.
    7. Sameeksha Desai & Zoltan J. Acs & Utz Weitzel, 2013. "A Model of Destructive Entrepreneurship," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 57(1), pages 20-40, February.
    8. Džuverovic Nemanja, 2013. "Does more (or less) lead to violence? Application of the relative deprivation hypothesis on economic inequality-induced conflicts," Croatian International Relations Review, Sciendo, vol. 19(68), pages 53-72, July.
    9. Daniel M. Hungerman, 2007. "Diversity and Crowd-out: A Theory of Cold-Glow Giving," NBER Working Papers 13348, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Tim Krieger & Daniel Meierrieks, 2016. "Does Income Inequality Lead to Terrorism?," CESifo Working Paper Series 5821, CESifo.
    11. Sameeksah Desai & Zoltán J. Ács & Utz Weitzel, 2015. "A Model of Destructive Entrepreneurship: Insight for Conflict and Postconflict Recovery," Chapters, in: Global Entrepreneurship, Institutions and Incentives, chapter 1, pages 3-23, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    12. Militiades N. Georgiou & Nicholas Kyriazis & Emmanouil M. L. Economou, 2015. "Democracy, Political Stability and Economic performance. A Panel Data Analysis," Journal of Risk & Control, Risk Market Journals, vol. 2(1), pages 1-18.
    13. Hassan F. Gholipour & Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, 2023. "Satisfaction with Amenities and Taste for Revolt in the Middle East," CESifo Working Paper Series 10503, CESifo.
    14. Huang,Zhangkai & Miao,Meng & Shao,Yi & Xu,L. Colin, 2021. "Warlords, State Failures, and the Rise of Communism in China," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9754, The World Bank.
    15. Adedokun, Ayokunu, 2017. "Post-conflict peacebuilding: A critical survey of the literature and avenues for future research," MERIT Working Papers 2017-016, United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    16. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Tim Krieger, 2018. "Oil Revenues Shocks and Inequality in Iran," Working Papers 1226, Economic Research Forum, revised 18 Sep 2018.
    17. Duha Altindag & Naci Mocan, 2010. "Joblessness and Perceptions about the Effectiveness of Democracy," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 99-123, June.
    18. Ajide, Kazeem B. & Alimi, Olorunfemi Y., 2021. "Income inequality, human capital and terrorism in Africa: Beyond exploratory analytics," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 218-240.
    19. Hungerman, Daniel M., 2009. "Crowd-out and diversity," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(5-6), pages 729-740, June.
    20. Dario Maimone Ansaldo Patti & Alba Marino & Pietro Navarra, 2021. "Freedom, diversity and the taste for revolt," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 74(2), pages 224-242, May.
    21. Ajide, Kazeem B. & Alimi, Olorunfemi Y., 2021. "Income inequality, human capital and terrorism in Africa: Beyond exploratory analytics," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 218-240.
    22. Bagchi, Aniruddha & Paul, Jomon A., 2018. "Youth unemployment and terrorism in the MENAP (Middle East, North Africa, Afghanistan, and Pakistan) region," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 9-20.
    23. Jude Okechukwu Chukwu, 2019. "Poverty Impact of Variations in Within-group and Between-group Inequality in Nigeria: New Estimates Using Two Household Survey Data," Social Indicators Research: An International and Interdisciplinary Journal for Quality-of-Life Measurement, Springer, vol. 141(2), pages 539-549, January.
    24. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan & Tim Krieger, 2018. "Oil Rents Shocks and Inequality in Iran," CESifo Working Paper Series 6876, CESifo.

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