Collective Bargaining Laws, Threat Effects, and the Determination of Police Compensation
AbstractThis article demonstrates that state collective bargaining laws are important determinants of union and nonunion public employee compensation. State laws that provide stronger bargaining rights and ensure closure to the bargaining process increase the direct effect of police unions on compensation. Moreover, indirect threat effects on the pay of nonunion police also increase with stronger bargaining laws. In each law category investigated, nonunion police receive most of the compensation premium enjoyed by unionized police. Previous studies that have not adequately controlled for these effects of bargaining laws have therefore underestimated the full effect of public-sector unions on compensation. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.
Volume (Year): 7 (1989)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/
Other versions of this item:
- Ichniowski, Casey & Freeman, Richard Barry & Lauer, Harrison, 1989. "Collective Bargaining Laws, Threat Effects, and the Determination of Police Compensation," Scholarly Articles 4631949, Harvard University Department of Economics.
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Juan Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael Porta & Florencio C. Lopez-De-Silanes, 2004.
"The Regulation of Labor,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 119(4), pages 1339-1382, November.
- Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Juan Botero, 2003. "The Regulation of Labor," NBER Working Papers 9756, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Juan Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael LaPorta & Florencio LÃ³pez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, . "The Regulation of Labor," Working Paper 19483, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Rebecca M. Blank, 1993. "Public Sector Growth and Labor Market Flexibility: The United States vs. The United Kingdom," NBER Working Papers 4339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Dean Hyslop, 2001.
"Measuring the effect of arbitration on wage levels: The case of police officers,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 54(2), pages 316-328, January.
- Orley Ashenfelter & Dean Hyslop, 1999. "Measuring the Effects of Arbitration on Wage Levels: The Case of Police Officers," NBER Working Papers 7294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gregory, Robert G. & Borland, Jeff, 1999. "Recent developments in public sector labor markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 53, pages 3573-3630 Elsevier.
- Anne Lauringson, 2010. "Measuring Union Bargaining Power In The Estonian Public Sector," University of Tartu - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration Working Paper Series 72, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, University of Tartu (Estonia).
- Ahn, Tom & Arcidiacono, Peter, 2004. "Paying to queue: a theory of locational differences in nonunion wages," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(3), pages 565-579, May.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.