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Trade Unions and the Efficiency of the Natural Rate of Unemployment

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  • Pissarides, Christopher A

Abstract

Decentralized wage setting in search equilibrium models is inefficient because the meeting firm and worker ignore the dependence of job-matching probabilities on the number of firms and worker engaged in search. This paper investigates whether risk-neutral monopolistic unions will have an incentive to internalize this externality. The author finds that the externality will be internalized only if the union's policy is chosen by unemployed persons. If employed persons influence union policy, both the union wage and unemployment will be too high. A tax on the union wage, combined with an employment subsidy to firms, can correct this inefficiency. Copyright 1986 by University of Chicago Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Pissarides, Christopher A, 1986. "Trade Unions and the Efficiency of the Natural Rate of Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(4), pages 582-595, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:4:y:1986:i:4:p:582-95
    DOI: 10.1086/298111
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    Cited by:

    1. Valeri Sorolla & José Ramón García, 2015. "When is there more employment, with individual or collective wage setting?," Working Papers 853, Barcelona School of Economics.
    2. Krusell, Per & Rudanko, Leena, 2016. "Unions in a frictional labor market," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 35-50.
    3. Burns,Andrew,Jooste,Charl,Schwerhoff,Gregor, 2021. "Climate Modeling for Macroeconomic Policy : A Case Study for Pakistan," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9780, The World Bank.
    4. Mulder, C.B., 1989. "Efficient and inefficient institutional arrangements between governments and trade unions : An explanation of high unemployment, corporatism and union fashing," Research Memorandum FEW 375, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Delacroix, Alain, 2006. "A multisectorial matching model of unions," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 573-596, April.
    6. Mulder, C B, 1993. "Wage-Moderating Effects of Corporatism: Decentralized versus Centralized Wage Setting in a Union, Firm, Government Context," The Manchester School of Economic & Social Studies, University of Manchester, vol. 61(3), pages 287-301, September.
    7. Bruno Decreuse, 2008. "Choosy Search And The Mismatch Of Talents," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(3), pages 1067-1089, August.
    8. Cai, Xiaoming & Gautier, Pieter A. & Teulings, Coen N. & Watanabe, Makoto, 2014. "Collective versus decentralized wage bargaining and the efficient allocation of resources," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(C), pages 34-42.
    9. Bridgman, Benjamin, 2015. "Competition, work rules and productivity," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 136-149.
    10. Pol Antràs & Arnaud Costinot, 2011. "Intermediated Trade," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(3), pages 1319-1374.
    11. Valeri Sorolla, 2014. "The Long Run Effect of Growth on Employment in a Labor Market with Matching Frictions: The Role of Labor Market Institutions," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 949.14, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC), revised 02 Feb 2015.
    12. Ranjan, Priya, 2013. "Offshoring, unemployment, and wages: The role of labor market institutions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 172-186.
    13. Föll, Tobias & Hartmann, Anna, 2019. "A Joint Theory of Polarization and Deunionization," VfS Annual Conference 2019 (Leipzig): 30 Years after the Fall of the Berlin Wall - Democracy and Market Economy 203558, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. García Martínez, José Ramón & Sorolla i Amat, Valeri, 2017. "When is there more employment, with individual or collective wage bargaining?," Economics Discussion Papers 2017-87, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    15. Ni, Xiaoran & Zhu, Weikang, 2018. "The bright side of labor protection in emerging markets: The case of firm transparency," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 126-143.
    16. Morin, Annaïg, 2017. "Cyclicality of wages and union power," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 1-22.

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