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Testing Dynamic Models of Worker Effort

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  • Machin, Stephen
  • Manning, Alan

Abstract

This article derives three dynamic models of worker effort determination based on a shirking efficiency wage model, a compensating differentials model, and a union-firm bargaining model. It shows that all of these three models have the same long-run comparative statics but differ in their short-run dynamics. The authors use these different predictions about the dynamics as a basis for testing the models. Euler equations for each model are estimated using panel data on 486 U.K. companies. The evidence supports the shirking model in firms with low levels of unionization but the bargaining model in highly unionized industries. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 10 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
Pages: 288-305

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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:10:y:1992:i:3:p:288-305

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Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/

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Cited by:
  1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:10:y:2008:i:9:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Frank Walsh, 2012. "Efficiency wages and bargaining," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 64(4), pages 635-654, October.
  3. Julie L. Hotchkiss & Myriam Quispe-Agnoli, 2009. "Employer monopsony power in the labor market for undocumented workers," Working Paper 2009-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
  4. Joyce P. Jacobsen & Gilbert L. Skillman, 2012. "Neoclassical Models of Imperfectly Competitive Labor Markets," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2012-007, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
  5. Sessions, John G. & Theodoropoulos, Nikolaos, 2008. "Tenure, Wage Profiles and Monitoring," IZA Discussion Papers 3307, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Alan Manning & J Thomas, 1997. "A Simple Test of the Shirking Model," CEP Discussion Papers dp0374, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  7. K Clark & M Tomlinson, 2001. "The Determinants of Work Effort: Evidence from the Employment in Britain Survey," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0113, Economics, The University of Manchester.
  8. Fernando Zanella, 2008. "Different times, different commitments, but the same old practices: failure of the efficiency wage model for socially devoted firms," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 10(9), pages 1-6.
  9. Katarzyna Budnik, 2012. "Do those who stay work less? On the impact of emigration on the measured TFP in Poland," National Bank of Poland Working Papers 113, National Bank of Poland, Economic Institute.
  10. Alan Manning & Jonathan Thomas, 1997. "A simple test of the shirking model," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 20300, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  11. Ourania Karakosta & Nikos Tsakiris, 2009. "Indirect Tax Reforms and Public Goods under Imperfect Competition," University of Cyprus Working Papers in Economics 5-2009, University of Cyprus Department of Economics.

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