Gaming Emotions in Social Interactions
AbstractOne's own emotions may influence someone else's behavior in a social interaction. If one believes this, she or he has an incentive to game emotions-to strategically modify the expression of a current emotional state-in an attempt to influence her or his counterpart. In a series of three experiments, this article investigates the extent to which people (1) misrepresent a current emotional state, (2) willfully acknowledge their strategic actions, (3) choose to game emotions over nonemotional information, and (4) improve their financial well-being from emotion gaming. (c) 2009 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc..
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Consumer Research.
Volume (Year): 36 (2009)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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