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Effects of Seller-Supplied Prices on Buyers' Product Evaluations: Reference Prices in an Internet Auction Context

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Author Info
Kamins, Michael A
Dreze, Xavier
Folkes, Valerie S
Abstract

A field experiment investigated the impact of two external reference points under the seller's control on the final price of an auction. When an item's seller specified a high external reference price (a reserve price), the final bid was greater than when the seller specified a low external reference price (a minimum bid). When the seller provided both high and low reference prices, the reserve influenced the final bid more. The low reference price led to a lower outcome compared to when the seller did not communicate any reference price. The number of bidders influenced outcomes in the absence of seller-supplied reference prices. Copyright 2004 by the University of Chicago.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Consumer Research.

Volume (Year): 30 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (March)
Pages: 622-28
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jconrs:v:30:y:2004:i:4:p:622-28

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  1. Amar Cheema & Peter Leszczyc & Rajesh Bagchi & Richard Bagozzi & James Cox & Utpal Dholakia & Eric Greenleaf & Amit Pazgal & Michael Rothkopf & Michael Shen & Shyam Sunder & Robert Zeithammer, 2005. "Economics, Psychology, and Social Dynamics of Consumer Bidding in Auctions," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 401-413, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Nicholas Shunda, 2007. "Auctions with a Buy Price: The Case of Reference-Dependent Preferences," Working papers 2007-42, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Stephanie Rosenkranz & Patrick W. Schmit, 2005. "Reserve prices in auctions as reference points," Working Papers 05-14, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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