The Optimistic Trust Effect: Use of Belief in a Just World to Cope with Decision-Generated Threat
AbstractIn a process the authors term just world coping, some consumers use positive beliefs concerning the general benevolence of the world as a resource to cope with marketplace threat. This belief buffers or even, ironically, enhances trust judgments in the face of threat. Three experiments and one replication show that, whereas consumers who do not hold this belief respond to decision-generated threat with distrust, trust is significantly higher for those who believe in a just world (optimistic trust effect). Process evidence shows such coping is automatically activated in response to threat but can be corrected for more normative considerations when an obvious ulterior motive is present. Finally, evidence this coping serves an ego-protective function is provided by manipulating whether consumers are directly threatened. Overall, findings are consistent with the view that belief in a just world operates as a positive illusion that allows consumers to cope with decision threat.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Consumer Research.
Volume (Year): 39 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
Pages: 615 - 628
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JCR/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Journals Division).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.