Optimal Mix Of Penalties In A Principal-Agent Model Under Different Institutional Arrangements
AbstractThis paper uses principal-agent theory to examine the optimal mix of monetary- and resource-based penalties in two institutional settings: a market economy and a centrally planned economy. In a centrally planned economy, an agent's wealth depends mostly on real resources and little on monetary resources; therefore, monetary-based penalties have less penalizing power than do resource-based penalties. Based on this premise, theory generates hypotheses regarding differences in the optimal mix of penalty types between the two economic systems. This paper empirically tests these hypotheses using data from the Czech Republic regarding enforcement responses to water-damaging accidents (such as oil spills). © 2000 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal The Review of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 82 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu/journals/
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lubomír Lízal & Dietrich Earnhart, 2002.
"Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate Environmental Performance,"
William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan
492, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Dietrich Earnhart & Lubomir Lizal, 2002. "Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate Environmental Performance," CERGE-EI Working Papers, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague wp203, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economic Institute, Prague.
- Earnhart, Dietrich & Lizal, Lubomir, 2002. "Effects of Ownership and Financial Status on Corporate Environmental Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3557, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Earnhart, Dietrich & Lizal, Lubomir, 2006. "Effects of ownership and financial performance on corporate environmental performance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 111-129, March.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Karie Kirkpatrick).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.