Economic Dynamics And Government Stability In Postwar Italy
AbstractIn this paper I estimate a duration model of the Italian government. The main finding of the paper is that the downfall probability of an Italian government depends on both political and economic factors. In particular, the higher the inflation rate and the higher the number of workhours lost in strikes both at the time a government forms and during its tenure in office, the more likely it is for a government to collapse. This result has important consequences for the validity of political theories of the business cycle. © 1998 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technolog
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal The Review of Economics and Statistics.
Volume (Year): 80 (1998)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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- Carmignani, Fabrizio, 2009. "The distributive effects of institutional quality when government stability is endogenous," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 25(4), pages 409-421, December.
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