Occupational Safety and Workers Preferences: Is There a Marginal Worker?
AbstractOccupational safety levels in nonunion firms are empirically shown to reflect only the preferences of workers with zero to three years job tenure. Therefore, ex post, the market is inefficient even if workers were optimizing at the time of hire since there are trades possible among workers that would make all workers better off. The workers who are ignored in the safety-setting process, those workers with more than three years job tenure, prefer less, not more, safety. Copyright 1987 by MIT Press.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by MIT Press in its journal Review of Economics & Statistics.
Volume (Year): 69 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
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- Marvasti, Akbar, 2008.
"Occupational Safety and English Language Proficiency,"
14490, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Mar 2009.
- Akbar Marvasti, 2010. "Occupational Safety and English Language Proficiency," Journal of Labor Research, Springer, vol. 31(4), pages 332-347, December.
- Shulamit Kahn, 1991. "Does Employer Monopsony Power Increase Occupational Accidents? The Case of Kentucky Coal Mines," NBER Working Papers 3897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1998.
"Changing Inequality in Markets for Workplace Amenities,"
NBER Working Papers
6515, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1999. "Changing Inequality In Markets For Workplace Amenities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1085-1123, November.
- Shulamit Kahn & Kevin Lang, 1987. "Constraints on the Choice of Work Hours: Agency vs. Specific-Capital," NBER Working Papers 2238, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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