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Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames, and Oligopolistic Equilibria


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  • Marschak, T A
  • Selten, Reinhard


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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by MIT Press in its journal Quarterly Journal of Economics.

Volume (Year): 92 (1978)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 71-93

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:qjecon:v:92:y:1978:i:1:p:71-93

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Cited by:
  1. Jim Andreoni, . "Do Government Subsidies Affect the Private Supply of Public Goods?," Papers _033, University of Michigan, Department of Economics.
  2. Joel Guttman & Michael Miller, 1979. "Endogenous Conjectural Variations in Duopoly," UCLA Economics Working Papers 150, UCLA Department of Economics.
  3. Stephen Willson, 1998. "Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 201-240, December.
  4. Farm, Ante, 2009. "Market Sharing and Price Leadership," Working Paper Series 3/2009, Swedish Institute for Social Research.
  5. Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 1994-3, Nobel Prize Committee.
  6. Currarini, Sergio & Marini, Marco, 2011. "Kinked norms of behaviour and cooperation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(3), pages 223-225, March.
  7. Subir K Chakrabarti, 1987. "Strong, Perfect Equilibrium Payoffs of Inertia Supergames," Discussion Papers 716, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Kalai, E & Neme, A, 1992. "The Strength of a Little Perfection," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 335-55.
  9. Willson, Stephen J., 2000. "Axioms for the outcomes of negotiation in matrix games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 323-348, May.


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